Your Body, Whose Choice? Responding to Bodily Autonomy With Clarity

In a way, it is actually the pro-life position that is most engaged in protecting the integrity of people’s bodies from being violated.

Following the one-year anniversary of the Dobbs Supreme Court decision, conversations about abortion are happening with increasing regularity as states take advantage of the change in legal precedent to enact measures aimed at protecting unborn children.

Now more than ever, pro-life advocates must find opportunities to make clear, concise, and compelling arguments on behalf of the unborn. Additionally, pro-lifers must expose the inhumanity of abortion to a broader culture that still remains largely ambivalent about the nature of abortion. 

To do this, pro-life advocates must communicate the moral logic of the pro-life position. The essential pro-life argument is simple: It’s wrong to intentionally kill innocent human beings. Elective abortion does that. Therefore, elective abortion is wrong. 

The science of embryology clearly states that the entity in the womb killed in an abortion is a human being, and moral philosophy shows that this human being doesn't differ in such a way that justifies killing it. In short, differences in size, level of development, environment, and degree of dependency are not good reasons to say we could be killed then but deserve protection now.

Very often, critics of the pro-life view won't refute this argument but will instead attack caricatures or change the subject to focus on the ideas related to abortion, such as choice, privacy, and the rights of women, without actually defending the act of abortion itself. Pro-lifers must recognize this, and helping critics stay on track will be the most effective at changing the culture. 

There is a caveat, however. 

In recent years, appeals to bodily autonomy have grown increasingly common and pose a unique challenge to the moral logic of the pro-life view. They don’t refute the above-mentioned argument; instead, they dismiss it entirely. 

The reason? It ultimately doesn’t matter if abortion results in a dead human being because no one can be compelled to provide bodily support to another human being against their will. The humanity of the unborn is simply irrelevant. 

Variations of this idea abound online and are rarely accompanied by much thought beyond snarky soundbites: “You can’t force me to care for someone against my will,” or, “Women are not incubators,” and perhaps the most popular, “My body, my choice.” Many times, pro-life advocates are accused of engaging in some gross conspiracy to “control” the bodies of women. 

These responses are nothing new. The notion of arguing for abortion by an appeal to "bodily autonomy" was first popularized in 1971 by a now-famous article penned by philosopher Judith Jarvis Thomson, with her "Violinist" analogy, and has been updated and defended in recent years by pro-choice philosophers such as David Boonin and Eileen McDonagh. 

Before diving deeper into the bodily rights arguments, it should be mentioned up front that the notion of a vast conspiracy to take control of women’s bodies is just plain silly. 

Pro-lifers(including the millions of women who are pro-life) have little interest in controlling the bodies of women. It’s bizarre to think of pro-lifers being opposed on moral grounds to women getting tattoos, breast enlargements, liposuction, using tobacco, or undergoing other elective procedures with the same intensity as they oppose abortion. 

On the flip side, abortion advocates who attack pro-lifers as bent on controlling women need to explain why it is pro-life advocates who routinely oppose practices such as embryo-destructive research and arguments for infanticide, two issues that have absolutely nothing to do with the bodies of women, to begin with. 

Moreover, defenders of abortion rarely take issues with restrictions on smoking in public or laws prohibiting drug use. No one who shouts “My body, My Choice” seems to think they are oppressed for not being able to legally use crystal meth, especially while pregnant. The rhetoric is often just not based in reality. Instead, it's meant to avoid deep thinking about the issue of abortion. 

However, Bodily Autonomy arguments tend to be more sophisticated. As Trent Horn notes, they typically fall into two areas of understanding: The body as a sovereign zone and a right to refuse to provide support. 

First, the sovereign zone. 

For many people, the morality of abortion doesn’t ultimately matter. Because abortion takes place within the body of a woman, it is the woman herself who has the ultimate say over abortion. Because women(and men) have the final say regarding what happens in and to their bodies, it makes sense to say that even if abortion is the deliberate killing of a human being, it is fundamentally unjust to deny a woman the ability to get an abortion. 

There are a multitude of problems with this line of thinking. 

First, it leads to absurd and often horrific results. Let's suppose it's true, a woman may choose whatever happens in and to her body, including abortion. If this is true, then there can be no limit at all on what a woman may choose to do at any time during pregnancy, including getting an abortion for frivolous reasons. 

Suppose a woman, who we’ll call Mary, is in her third trimester of pregnancy and decides she no longer wants the baby she is about to give birth to. Maybe she has decided it isn't the right time for her, or her boyfriend dumped her, and she now is stuck with the reality of being a single mom. Are we supposed to be open to abortion in this case? 

Let's change the scenario a bit. Suppose, instead of giving birth, she finds out that biotech research firms will pay handsomely for donated fetal body parts. Seeing an opportunity to make the most of a bad situation through financial gain, she gets a third-trimester abortion and sells the body parts of her baby for cash. 

Has anything wrong been done here? If the rhetoric of "Her body, her choice" is to be believed, no one can criticize this decision. And yet, curiously, when the topic of late-term elective abortion for even frivolous reasons comes up, most defenders of abortion are quick to point out that late-term abortions are almost never performed for reasons other than medical necessity. 

But why add this qualification? If a woman has a sovereign right to decide what happens in and to her body, then who cares? Clearly, a Sovereign Zone understanding is not as compelling as we might hope. 

Let's change the scenario once again. 

Suppose a woman goes to her doctor seeking treatment for her morning sickness. Reading online about how Thalidomide can be used to treat the symptoms, she demands her doctor administer the drug to her. 

The doctor refuses, citing how the drug is known to cause severe birth defects in children and has caused babies to be born without limbs. The woman, believing she has a Sovereign right to decide what happens in and to her body, goes behind the doctor's back and obtains the drug herself, and a few months later, gives birth to a baby with no arms or legs. Has she done something wrong? 

What about in regards to other drugs? What do we think of a pregnant woman using a drug such as crystal meth while pregnant, even if the harm to her baby will be severe? Are we okay with this? 

Perry Hendricks raises a slightly different question. What would we think about a woman purposely giving her baby fetal alcohol syndrome? Suppose a woman gets pregnant so she can participate in a paid research study on the effects of fetal alcohol syndrome on newborns. Nine months later, she gives birth to a child with severe cognitive disabilities. Is there something wrong with this? 

The list of possibilities here is endless. 

More scenarios can be listed, but the point here is to show the price of holding the Sovereign Zone view is a steep one and ends up meaning virtually any and all abortions which can be conceived of are acceptable. 

There are other problems as well. As Chris Kaczor notes, the "My Body, My Choice" mantra is a non-argument. When a person says they may have an abortion because they get to decide what to do with their own body, all they have done is restate their own premise. 

In other words, a person can have an abortion because they can do whatever they want with their body, and because they can do whatever they want with their own body, they can have an abortion if they so choose. As Kaczor notes, this is nonsense. They still have to explain why "Doing what I want with my body" should include abortion in the first place or explain why exercising their bodily autonomy includes abortion. 

The Sovereign Zone view, as stated above, tends to be more of a lay-level understanding of the issue. The Right to Refuse view, however, is a bit more complex. 

As mentioned earlier, Judith Jarvis Thomson's argument in a 1971 piece titled "A Defense of Abortion" first popularized the notion a woman may get an abortion just like she may refuse to provide bodily support to another person. 

To summarize, Thomson suggests thinking about it this way: You wake up one morning to find yourself in bed, connected to a famous Violinist, who you are told needs to rely on your kidneys to keep him alive due to an ailment he has. 

The medical staff, as well as the Society of Music Lovers, inform you the connection will only last nine months, then you may disconnect. However, if you disconnect before then, the Violinist will most likely die. 

Should you be allowed to do this? 

According to Thomson, while it might be very noble to remain connected to the Violinist, it is unreasonable and unjust to force someone to do so against their will. Conversely, it is also unjust to force a woman to stay connected to an unborn child (whom Thomson acknowledges for the sake of argument could be a person with value) against her will. 

This thought experiment has grown in popularity over the years, and it's quite common to see smirking activists use it to stun pro-lifers into silence, touting it as the end-all defeater of pro-life arguments.

While the argument appears strong, it is deeply flawed. 

First, suppose you wake up connected to an unconscious Violinist, as in Thomson’s scenario. However, instead of you giving him bodily support, he is supporting you. The doctor informs you that a mad scientist kidnapped and connected the two of you in order to prove a point, and you were both rescued by the police, who brought you to the hospital. However, there is a caveat. 

Because you rely on the Violinist for survival, he has the final say in whether you stay connected or not. The doctor informs you that if the Violinist, a young musical protege touted as the next Stradivarius, decides he wants to disconnect from you, the medical staff is obligated to do so. 

After all, your presence is a danger to his musical career. However, the disconnecting process will kill you outright. If you so choose, however, the medical staff may euthanize you in a painless manner. The doctor apologizes but says that since you have no right to use another person’s body for your survival without their consent, you will likely die pretty soon. 

Think about it for just a moment. Does it really make sense to say that a person is under no moral obligation whatsoever to provide bodily support to another person’s life against their will, but they may have a moral obligation to give up their life if supporting them may impede your livelihood? Moreover, it seems strange to say you cannot seek someone to give you bodily support under any circumstance if they refuse to do so, but you may seek their death itself as a means to your own ends. 

Christopher Kaczor asks a slightly different question. While it’s true you did not ask to be connected to the Violinist, he also did not ask to be connected to you. Maybe he sees someone else he would rather be connected to. 

Maybe someone who is better looking, better company, and simply a better time being around (remember, you do want him dead, after all). If he can disconnect from you, even if doing so would kill you, may he do it? As Kaczor notes, when we start to think about things from the Violinist's perspective, things suddenly start to look a lot less compelling. 

There are other issues as well. 

While Thomson’s argument portrays abortion as a simple act of unplugging, abortion is anything but (ironically, giving birth is more akin to unplugging, but let’s digress for now). Abortion often involves more active participation on behalf of the abortionist, especially in the form of a violent attack on the body of the unborn child in question. 

Abortion methods often involve suction, lethal injection, and dismemberment through the use of surgical forceps while still inside the womb. While some defenders of abortion defend the death of the unborn child as a side effect of the “unplugging,” this is hard to defend. One medical text instructing doctors to perform abortions past viability is especially clear in this regard:

“Where the fetal abnormality is not lethal and abortion is being undertaken after 22 weeks’ gestation, failure to perform feticide (Ie administer drugs to kill the fetus) could result in a live birth and survival, an outcome that contradicts the intention of the abortion. In such situations, the baby should receive the neonatal support and intensive care that is in the infant’s best interest and its condition managed within published guidance for neonatal practice.”¹

Clearly, abortion involves more than a simple act of “unplugging” in which a person dies of their underlying health deficiencies; it involves direct action geared towards killing the prenatal human being. 

Thomson’s analogy(and those like it) fail to take this into account and ultimately fails to justify abortion as it is currently performed. As Francis Beckwith puts it, calling abortion merely the withholding of support is like smothering someone with a pillow and calling it merely the withholding of oxygen. There is a lot more at play that needs to be addressed. 

Additionally, while it may seem reasonable to think strangers have no obligations to provide bodily support to one another, what about parents regarding their own children? Do parents have a right to withhold support from their own children if they so choose? 

As Scott Klusendorf asks, what would we think of Thomson’s analogy if a woman woke up connected not to a stranger, an adult violinist, but to her own child? Would we unhesitatingly agree that, yes, a mother can refuse to support her child even in this circumstance? We would likely not look at such a person as a heroic defender of autonomy but as a narcissistic moral monster.

Chris Kaczor proposes a different way of illustrating this problem. Suppose a woman is late in her pregnancy and is planning to place her baby for adoption upon giving birth. She travels to a cabin in the mountains to spend some time alone before she gives birth. 

The cabin is well-stocked with food and supplies, and she doesn’t plan to leave the cabin for resupply anytime soon. However, an avalanche occurs, burying the cabin in snow and isolating her from the outside world for the next week. Additionally, the stress of the event causes her to go into labor several weeks prematurely, causing her to give birth to her viable infant, who now needs her breast milk to survive until rescue. 

Rescuers manage to dig the cabin out and rescue her but are stunned to see a dead infant in the cabin. When asked about it, the woman informs them that since she did not consent to be the infant’s parent and(citing Thomson) was under no obligation to provide bodily support if she chose not to, she let the infant die of starvation instead of breastfeeding the infant. 

Has she done something wrong? Clearly, she has. While some critics may push back at this point and say that because of her autonomy, she could refuse, it should be pointed out that such critics are in the awkward position of essentially arguing that when faced with a choice between sustaining a starving infant through the use of one’s body and letting an infant starve so one can exercise control over their body, starving an infant is clearly the more reasonable option. This isn’t just absurd. It’s insane. 

As Helen Watt notes, it’s actually perfectly reasonable to expect parents to provide support, even bodily support, to their own children, as said parents themselves have received such care and support from their own parents, and so on and so forth, Every person who has ever lived, including devout abortion rights activists, has been a “violinist” at the beginning of their lives, which in turn makes the Right to Refusal seem less of a reasonable option and more like a reflection of a self-obsessed way of viewing the world. 

In conclusion, Bodily-Rights appeals and arguments don’t ultimately undermine the pro-life position. Ironically, they can actually end up undermining the pro-choice position.

 If the moral thing to do is to refrain from interfering or making decisions about the bodies of other people against their will, then abortion immediately gets ruled out of the question. Abortion is itself deciding what happens in and to another body in a deliberately lethal manner.

 Abortion advocates are openly demanding that doctors use medical instruments to violate the bodily integrity of another human being by suctioning them or tearing them apart piece by piece. In a way, it is actually the pro-life position that is most engaged in protecting the integrity of people’s bodies from being violated. 

1. Rowlands, Samuel. (2014). Abortion Care. Cambridge University Press, 144.